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PUBLIC ACCESS VS. PRIVATE PROPERTY: 
THE STRUGGLE OF COASTAL LANDOWNERS 
TO KEEP THE PUBLIC OFF THEIR LAND 
James D. Donahue∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
The power struggle between private coastal landowners and 
state governments has raged for decades.1 While landowners seek to 
protect their constitutional rights and maintain the privacy of their 
oceanfront properties, states aim to break through private lot lines to 
make state-owned beaches more accessible to the public.2 This 
struggle is particularly important in the nation’s most populous state 
of California, where an estimated 80 percent of the state’s thirty-four 
million citizens live within an hour’s drive of the coast.3 For many 
decades, California landowners have enjoyed almost exclusive and 
private access to publicly owned beaches due to a lack of public 
access points along the privately owned coastline.4 The norm 
changed, however, in the 1970s with the creation of the California 
Coastal Commission and the passage of the Coastal Act of 1976, 
through which the state made an aggressive legislative push to open 
the beaches to the public by requiring coastal landowners to grant 
public easements across their properties.5 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science &
History, Boston College, May 2013. Thank you to Professor Florrie Roberts, whose expertise and 
advice made this Article possible, and to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review for their hard work and dedication. Finally, thank you to my family and friends for their 
continual support and encouragement. 
1. Sean T. Morris, Comment, Taking Stock in the Public Trust Doctrine: Can States
Provide for Public Beach Access Without Running Afoul of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence?, 
52 CATH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2003). 
2. Robert Garcia & Erica Flores Baltodano, Free the Beach! Public Access, Equal Justice,
and the California Coast, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 143, 144 (2005). 
3. Morris, supra note 1, at 1015.
4. Garcia & Baltodano, supra note 2, at 145; Morris, supra note 1, at 1016.
5. Morris, supra note 1, at 1016.
218 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:217 
As California’s population grows and the state continues to push 
for public access, many coastal landowners have resorted to the 
judicial process to challenge the state’s power.6 This Note addresses 
the struggle between coastal landowners and the state, with a focus 
on the problematic and inefficient legislation through which the latter 
has effectively used its police power to infringe upon the 
constitutional property rights of the former.7 After a comprehensive 
discussion of the existing law followed by an in-depth critique, this 
Note offers a legislative proposal to effectively supersede the current 
law in the hopes of more effectively balancing state interests with 
those of coastal landowners. 
II. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
Public beach access has long been a source of contentious 
debate between coastal landowners and the government.8 With the 
hope of opening private beaches to the public, the government has 
relied upon the Public Trust Doctrine9 to prevent landowners from 
excluding the public from coastal zones.10 On the other hand, in 
hopes of maintaining privacy, property values, and exclusivity, 
landowners have asserted their Fifth Amendment rights under the 
Takings Clause of the Constitution11 to prevent the government from 
seizing their lands for public access. In an attempt to solve this 
age-old problem, California established the California Coastal 
Commission (“Coastal Commission”) by voter initiative in 1972,12 
6. Id.
7. See infra Sections II.C.2–III.
8. Philip J. Hess, A Line in the Sand: Oceanfront Landowners and the California Coastal
Commissions Have Been Battling over Easements Allowing Public Access to Beaches, L.A. LAW., 
Jan. 2005, at 24.  
9. The Public Trust Doctrine states that “lands were held by the state, as they were by the
king, in trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, 
piers, light-houses, beacons, and other facilities of navigation and commerce.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. 
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892); see also infra Section II.A.
10. See infra Section II.A.
11. U.S. CONST. art. V; see also CAL. CONST. art. X (stating that “[n]o individual . . .
claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal lands . . . or other navigable water in this State, shall 
be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public 
purpose . . . and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction to 
this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for 
the people thereof.”). 
12. Who We Are: Program Overview, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, http://coastal.ca.gov/whowe
are.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
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and later enacted the California Coastal Act of 1976 (“Coastal 
Act”).13 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
Dating back fifteen hundred years to the Roman emperor 
Justinian14 and subsequently adopted by the English common law, 
the Public Trust Doctrine is an important source of power for states 
asserting property rights against private landowners. However, it was 
not until 1892 that the Supreme Court entirely articulated the theory 
of Public Trust. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,15 the 
Supreme Court explained that “lands were held by the state, as they 
were by the king, in trust for the public uses of navigation and 
fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, 
beacons, and other facilities of navigation and commerce.”16 In 
regard to coastal access, “land below the high-water line is held in 
public trust by the state.”17 While there is no dispute that the states 
own the land below the mean high tide line, oftentimes the public has 
no way to access the coastal zones from public streets due to an 
uninterrupted string of private landownership along the coast.18 It is 
for this reason that states attempt to open public access points that 
allow people to enjoy the lands held in public trust, largely to the 
displeasure of private landowners.19 
B. The California Coastal Commission
Given that more than half of the U.S. population lives and works 
within fifty miles of the coast, yet roughly 70 percent of the coastline 
is privately owned,20 coastal access has presented major issues for 
state governments and the general public. In order to provide public 
access, California established the Coastal Commission in 1972 by 
13. Id.
14. Bill Schneider, Coastline Access: The Battle over Beachfront Ownership, CNN (Aug. 9,
2002, 5:02 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/09/ip.pol.beach/. 
15. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
16. Id. at 457.
17. Colin H. Roberts, It’s All Mine, Stay Off, and Let Me Do What I Please: An Abyss
Between the Rights and Desires of Coastal Property Owners and Privileges and Protections?, 18 
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 255, 264 (2013). 
18. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26.
19. Id. at 24–26.
20. See Schneider, supra note 14.
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means of a voter initiative.21 In the spirit of the Public Trust 
Doctrine, “[t]he mission of the Coastal Commission is to protect, 
conserve, restore, and enhance environmental and human-based 
resources of the California coast and ocean for environmentally 
sustainable and prudent use by current and future generations.”22 
C. The California Coastal Act of 1976
and the Offer to Dedicate 
In order to give the Coastal Commission the necessary power to 
carry out its mission, the California legislature passed the California 
Coastal Act of 1976.23 Among the five basic goals laid out in the 
Coastal Act was the goal to “[m]aximize public access to and along 
the coast and maximize public recreational opportunities in the 
coastal zone consistent with sound resources conservation principles 
and constitutionally protected rights of private property owners.”24 
To increase the number of public access points along the largely 
privately owned California coast, the Coastal Act requires that “any 
person . . . wishing to perform or undertake any development in the 
coastal zone . . . shall obtain a coastal development permit.”25 
While the requirement to obtain a development permit seems 
neutral on its face, the Coastal Commission has used the Coastal Act 
to leverage private landowners into providing an Offer to Dedicate 
(“OTD”), otherwise known as a public access easement,26 almost 
each and every time landowners seek to develop their lands.27 OTDs 
do not become public easements immediately, as two conditions 
must be met before they are usable.28 First, the OTD must be 
accepted by an entity that assumes the responsibility of opening and 
managing the access on terms acceptable to the Coastal 
Commission.29 Second, the OTD acceptance must usually occur 
21. See CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, supra note 12.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30001.5 (West 2014).
25. Id. § 30600.
26. Coastal Access Program: Offer to Dedicate (OTD)—Public Access Easement Program,
CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, http://www.coastal.ca.gov/access/otd-access.html (last visited Oct. 25, 
2014).  
27. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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within twenty-one years of recordation.30 If these two conditions are 
met, the OTD converts into a permanent public easement that will 
continuously burden the property.31 However, if the OTD is not 
accepted in a timely manner, the OTD “expires and the contingent 
obligation to provide public access is extinguished.”32 
1. Procedural Hurdles in Challenging an OTD
Naturally, private landowners who were given development 
permits on the condition that they offer an OTD for public access 
were unhappy.33 While some easements were opened without a 
challenge, agitated and litigious landowners have sought judicial 
review regarding the constitutionality of granting development 
permits contingent on an OTD.34 The Coastal Act lays out the very 
strict procedure for judicial challenge. The Coastal Act states that 
“[a]ny aggrieved person shall have a right to judicial review of any 
decision or action of the commission by filing a petition for a writ of 
mandate . . . within sixty days after the decision or action has become 
final.”35 However, the statute of limitations bars petitions challenging 
Coastal Commission permits that are not filed by a write of mandate 
within sixty days.”36 
The strict time limit for judicial review of Coastal Commission 
permit decisions has sparked intense litigation. The California Court 
of Appeal has ruled that inverse condemnation—a cause of action 
resulting from “a public taking of (or interference with) land without 
formal eminent domain proceedings”—does not create an exception 
to the sixty-day statute of limitations.37 Rather, “[t]he rule requiring 
timely writ holds true even when the aggrieved individuals asserting 
inverse condemnation are successors in interest to prior owners who 
30. Id; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1213 (West 2014) (“An instrument is deemed to be
recorded when, being duly acknowledged or proved and certified, it is deposited in the Recorder's 
office, with the proper officer, for record . . . . Every conveyance of real property or an estate for 
years therein acknowledged or proved and certified and recorded as prescribed by law from the 
time it is filed with the recorder for record is constructive notice of the contents thereof to 
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees.”). 
31. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26; see also Jessica A. Duncan, Article, Coastal Justice: The
Case for Public Access, 11 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 55, 62 (2004). 
32. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30801 (West 2007).
36. Serra Canyon Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 110, 113 (Ct. App. 2004).
37. Id. at 114.
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accepted the burdens and benefits of the Commission’s conditional 
permits.”38 This means that even when a party assumes an interest in 
coastal land as a bona fide purchaser, it is unable to challenge an 
OTD given by a previous owner unless it does so within sixty days, 
even though it was not an interested party at the time the OTD was 
given.39 
2. State Police Power Versus the Takings Clause
If a landowner adheres to the strict requirements to obtain 
judicial review, courts are faced with a battle between the state’s 
police power and the landowner’s Fifth Amendment rights. 
California justifies its taking of private lands for public access as an 
exercise of its police power. Specifically, the California Constitution 
states that: 
No individual . . . claiming or possessing the frontage or 
tidal lands . . . or other navigable water in this State, shall 
be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water 
whenever it is required for any public purpose . . . and the 
Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most 
liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the 
navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for 
the people thereof.40 
On the other hand, landowners assert that requiring an OTD or 
public easement in exchange for a development permit is a violation 
of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states, “private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”41 In an attempt to add clarity to the legality of 
requiring OTDs and public easements for development permits, in 




40. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
42. 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
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a. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
and the “nexus test” 
Like many judicial challenges arising in California against the 
Coastal Commission, the Nollans were private landowners who 
sought a permit to develop coastal property.43 The Coastal 
Commission granted the permit subject to the Nollans’ recordation of 
a deed restriction granting a public easement.44 The Nollans 
challenged the requirement of a public easement on the ground that 
their proposed development was not shown to have a direct adverse 
impact on public beach access.45 In response, the Coastal 
Commission argued that “the new house would increase blockage of 
the view of the ocean, thus contributing to the development of ‘a 
wall’ of residential structures that would prevent the public 
‘psychologically . . . from realizing a stretch of coastline exists 
nearby that they have every right to visit.’”46 
The Supreme Court rejected the Coastal Commission’s 
arguments, stating that “[i]t is quite impossible to understand how a 
requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to 
walk across the Nollans’ property reduces any obstacles to viewing 
the beach created by the new house.”47 The Court pointed to the 
“lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the 
building restriction . . . .”48 Had the Coastal Commission attached a 
condition related to the public’s ability to see the beach, such as a 
height limitation, or even required a public viewing spot, the 
condition would have been constitutional.49 However, “unless the 
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the 
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of 
land use but “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”50 In closing, the 
Court explained that California is free to pursue its “comprehensive 
program” by using its power of eminent domain, rather than police 
43. Id. at 825.
44. Id. at 828.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 828–29.
47. Id. at 838.
48. Id. at 837.
49. Id. at 836.
50. Id. at 837.
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power, unless the abridgement of property rights through the police 
power substantially advances a legitimate state interest.51  
Nollan was a victory for private landowners since the Supreme 
Court’s requirement of a nexus between the condition and the 
purpose of the building restriction “severely limited California’s 
attempt to obtain beach access easements.”52 Several cases following 
Nollan, such as Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal 
Commission,53 reached the same conclusion. The Surfside court 
explained that “Nollan requires a ‘close connection’ between the 
burden and the condition,”54 and subsequently found that the 
Commission failed to demonstrate a nexus that could constitutionally 
force the appellants to grant a public access easement on their 
revetment.55 
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nollan failed to 
clarify many of the important issues surrounding judicial review of 
Coastal Commission development permits, such as the standard of 
review to apply and the burden of proof to impose. In 1992, the 
California Court of Appeal addressed both the standard of review 
and burden of proof in Antoine v. California Coastal Commission.56 
b. Antoine v. California Coastal Commission
and the standard of review 
The Antoine court explained the two available standards of 
review. The first, the independent judgment test, “applies where the 
decision of the administrative agency affects or involves a 
‘fundamental vested right’ . . . .”57 Using the independent judgment 
test, the court simply applies its independent judgment to the matter. 
If the decision does not involve a fundamental vested right, the court 
is to apply the substantial evidence test, in which a court is “limited 
to determining whether the administrative findings are supported by 
substantial evidence and whether the agency erred in its application 
51. Id. at 841.
52. See Morris, supra note 1, at 1027.
53. 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 371 (Ct. App. 1991).
54. Id. at 378.
55. Id. at 378–79; A revetment is a sloping structure, usually made of stone, that is placed on
a bank or cliff to absorb the energy of incoming water. Revetments are installed to protect tidal 
lands from erosion caused by waves and ocean storms. 
56. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 471 (Ct. App. 1992).
57. Id. at 476.
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of the law.”58 The court went on to explain that “[a]s we read Nollan, 
there is no fundamental right to build a structure that detrimentally 
affects public access free of conditions designed to ameliorate the 
detrimental effect of the structure.”59 Given this reading of Nollan, it 
became clear that the substantial evidence test would become the 
prevailing standard of review in challenging the Coastal 
Commission.60 
Antoine also addressed the question of which party has the 
burden of proof. Appellant landowners argued that the Coastal 
Commission had to prove the reasons behind the denial or conditions 
of a development permit, whereas the Coastal Commission argued 
that permit applicants were required to prove that they are not 
harming coastal resources or access. The Antoine court explained, 
“[a]lthough the Coastal Act does not expressly place the burden of 
proof on any party, the general rule applicable to land use permits is 
that the burden is on the applicant.”61 The court resolved that placing 
the burden of proof on the applicant is a just result because it is most 
protective of coastal resources.62 In the wake of the Antoine decision, 
it became clear that the burden was squarely on the agitated 
landowners.63 
D. Questions Remaining After Nollan and Antoine
Despite the implication that challenges to the Coastal 
Commission would be far less complicated and litigiously efficient 
following Antoine, this was not the case.64 Over the past two 
decades, numerous landowners have filed suits to challenge the 
Coastal Commission’s permit conditions. A notable example is a 
2002 writ of mandate filed by media mogul David Geffen 
challenging the Coastal Commission’s OTD condition on his 
development permit.65 Even more recently, billionaire venture 
capitalist Vinod Kholsa filed a writ of mandate in 2013 challenging a 
58. Id.
59. Id. at 476–77.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 478.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also infra Section III.B.
64. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26–27 (discussing the number of OTDs that have been
secured, as well as the litigious response of many landowners in challenging the approval of their 
development permit conditioned on the gift of a lateral easement). 
65. City of Malibu v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 503 (Ct. App. 2005).
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public easement across his land.66 As a result of the inconsistent 
interpretations and rulings of California courts,67 landowners and the 
Coastal Commission continue to litigate the hotly contested issue. As 
animosity between the two groups continues to grow, the state needs 
to establish a clear, concise, and coherent rule regarding government-
imposed conditions on privately owned land for public benefit. 
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
A. The California Coastal Commission as
a Political Machine 
After the Coastal Commission’s creation in 1972, it was given 
nearly unfettered discretion in regulating coastal lands and public 
access points.68 Due to the requirement that each and every 
development of private coastal land obtain a coastal development 
permit,69 the Coastal Commission possesses immense power over 
private landowners, which ultimately goes unchecked.70 This 
concentration of power, along with the strict procedural requirements 
defined by the Coastal Act in challenging an OTD, makes it 
extremely difficult for private landowners to challenge the 
government’s taking of their private lands.71 
When a landowner seeks to challenge the Coastal Commission’s 
conditional requirement of an OTD in order to develop his or her 
land, the burden falls squarely on the landowner.72 In challenging an 
OTD, the determinations and decisions of the Coastal Commission 
are “accorded a ‘strong presumption of correctness’ by California 
courts, which resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the 
administrative decision and uphold it unless a reasonable person 
could not reach the same conclusion.”73 Furthermore, “a jury trial is 
not available by right in a mandamus proceeding, although the court 
66. Katy Steinmentz, Surfers Beat Billionaire in Landmark California Beach Case, TIME
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://time.com/3426864/vinod-khosla-martins-beach-lawsuit/. 
67. See infra Section III.B.
68. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26.
69. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30600 (West 2007).
70. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26.
71. See supra Section II.C.1.
72. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26–27.
73. Id. at 27.
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has discretion to impanel a jury to determine essential issues of 
fact.”74 
The strict time requirements in a mandamus proceeding, paired 
with the presumption of correctness in Coastal Commission 
decisions, make it extremely difficult for private landowners to 
challenge an OTD.75 In protecting the Coastal Commission’s 
administrative decisions by requiring only the showing of the 
reasonable person standard,76 California courts have deferred to the 
Coastal Commission and protected the state’s interests at the expense 
of the landowners’ property rights. This means that a petitioner’s 
land will diminish in value because of an OTD or public easement 
unless he or she can prove that the Coastal Commission’s decisions 
fail to meet the minimalist reasonable person standard.77 With the 
deck stacked against the petitioner, the Coastal Commission and its 
decisions are afforded great protection. As a result, it has become an 
almost untouchable political machine. 
B. Ongoing Lack of Clarity and Consistency
Despite Nollan and Antoine, litigation in California has 
remained inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary.78 Where some courts 
have no problem finding a substantial relationship,79 others find 
none.80 It is this lack of consistency and clarity that spurs additional 
litigation, which is both costly and burdensome. 
1. Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Commission
Only one year after Nollan, the Jonathan Club (“Club”) in Santa 
Monica filed a challenge after the Coastal Commission granted a 
coastal development permit on the condition that the Club adopt a 
nondiscriminatory membership provision.81 The Coastal Commission 
found that the “proposed project would permanently convert existing 





78. See supra Sections II.C.2.a–b.
79. See infra Section III.B.1; see also Jonathan Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 243 Cal. Rptr.
168, 178 (Ct. App. 1988). 
80. See infra Section III.B.2; see also Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 277
Cal. Rptr. 371, 376 (Ct. App. 1991). 
81. Jonathan Club, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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membership while inhibiting or preventing the general public from 
enjoying a publicly owned area of the beach.”82 Although the case 
did not involve an OTD, the court still used Nollan to support its 
holding.83 
In discussing whether a nexus between the condition and the 
expressed government purpose existed, as is required by Nollan, the 
court stated that there was a “direct connection between the 
governmental purpose of maximizing public access to state beach 
lands and the condition which is imposed. Again, by precluding 
discrimination against minorities . . . , the Commission maximized 
the possibility that all segments of the public will have access to the 
leased land.”84 As California courts normally do, the Jonathan Club 
court yielded a “strong presumption of correctness”85 to the Coastal 
Commission’s decision, resulting in a favorable decision for the 
state. 
2. Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Commission
In 1991, Surfside Colony (“Surfside”), a private, gated,
residential community, challenged the Coastal Commission’s 
conditional requirement of an OTD to build a revetment that would 
protect the beach from erosion.86 More specifically, the Coastal 
Commission outlined four conditions, including an easement for 
public access and passive recreational use along the beach, an 
easement for the future construction of a boardwalk, an easement for 
pedestrian and bicycle access across Surfside property, and 
conspicuous signage to inform the public of its right to cross 
Surfside’s property.87 Surfside promptly filed a petition with the 
superior court for a writ of mandate, asking the court to discard the 
conditions imposed by the Coastal Commission.88 
82. Id.
83. Although Jonathan Club does not revolve around an OTD, California Courts have used
the Nollan standard to resolve nearly all cases that involve a conditional grant of a coastal 
development permit by the Coastal Commission. These cases, although factually different, 
involve the same legal principles and contribute to the understanding of OTD litigation and 
applicable legal standards. 
84. Jonathan Club, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
85. See Hess, supra note 8, at 27.
86. Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 374–75 (Ct. App.
1991). 
87. Id. at 374.
88. Id. at 375.
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Applying the substantial evidence test articulated in Nollan,89 
the court held that there was no substantial evidence to justify a 
nexus between the revetment and the public access requirement.90 
Based on expert studies on erosion and photographs of Surfside 
Beach submitted by the Coastal Commission, the court determined 
that “the Commission had no evidence at all establishing this 
revetment would cause erosion at this beach.”91 Rather, the court 
found that the photographs show a change for the better, indicating 
that the revetment at Surfside Beach may have actually reversed 
erosion.92 As a result, the Surfside court held that under Nollan, the 
public access requirement “must be deemed a ‘taking’ of [Surfside]’s 
property.”93 Furthermore, the court explained that Nollan’s “close 
connection” entails, at the very least, evidence more substantial than 
general studies,94 tacitly raising the standard of review for OTD 
challenges. 
3. Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n
v. California Coastal Commission
Much like in Surfside, in 2008 the Ocean Harbor House 
Homeowners Association (the “Association”) sought a coastal 
development permit to build a seawall to protect their condominium 
complex from structurally damaging erosion.95 While the Coastal 
Commission granted the Association’s coastal development permit 
due to the serious threat to the structure’s integrity, it imposed a $5.3 
million fee to mitigate the loss of an acre of public beach and the loss 
of lateral beach access for public recreational use.96 
The Association was not happy with the size of the mitigation 
fees.97 Specifically, the Coastal Commission’s environmental report 
determined that the loss of beach amounted to roughly $1 million in 
land value, but there were other impacts of the proposed project that 
89. See supra Section II.C.2.a; see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837
(1987). 




94. Id. at 377–78.
95. Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432,
435 (Ct. App. 2008). 
96. Id. at 436–38.
97. Id. at 450.
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should be taken into account.98 One of the commissioners on the 
Coastal Commission then proposed $5.3 million in mitigation fees, 
opining that the Coastal Commission was “underestimating the value 
of public land . . . .”99 After some discussion, the Coastal 
Commission subsequently adopted the proposed $5.3 million 
mitigation fee. This seems to be a direct contradiction to the standard 
of review enunciated in Surfside, which requires more than general 
studies, let alone opinions of individual commissioners, to constitute 
a “close connection.”100 As a result, the Association challenged the 
condition in a timely mandamus proceeding.101 
The Ocean Harbor court explained that the Nollan nexus is 
applicable to the case, and that the state’s interest in protecting the 
beach had a close connection with the mitigation fee condition.102 
The greatest obstacle, however, was justifying the $5.3 million fee. 
The court reasoned that Coastal Commission’s report determined the 
economic expenditure of beach visitors to be roughly $13 per visit.103 
The Association challenged this figure, as there was no evidence that 
the public used this particular beach, nor had such a study been done 
specifically for Monterrey County beaches.104 
In a direct rejection of Surfside’s requirement for specific 
studies to show a “close connection” or nexus, the court accepted the 
Commission’s report, which explicitly conceded that “[w]ith respect 
to economic value of Monterey’s beaches, there have been no 
specific economic studies done regarding the per-person beach 
expenditures in the Monterey area.”105 The court was unfazed by the 
lack of specificity in the report, and was convinced that “$13 per 
person per visit is probably a reasonable estimate for the consumer 
surplus of the beaches in the Monterey area.”106 Once again, 
California courts were at odds with one another over the applicable 
standard of review in Coastal Commission condition cases. 
98. Id. at 438.
99. Id. at 438–39.
100. Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 377–78 (Ct. App.
1991); see also supra Section III.B.2. 
101. Ocean Harbor, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 440.
102. Id. at 445.
103. Id. at 449.
104. Id. at 450.
105. Id. at 448.
106. Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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C. Lack of Compensation as a Non-Regulatory Taking
Apart from the noise, foot traffic, and general nuisance that 
result after private lands are opened by way of a public easement, 
landowners are particularly outraged by the lack of compensation in 
what they consider an unjust regulatory taking of private property.107 
Once an OTD is properly recorded and converts into a public 
easement, landowners permanently lose title to the property that is 
the subject of the OTD.108 The inconsistency and arbitrariness of the 
Coastal Commission’s decisions and subsequent court rulings make 
it too easy for the Coastal Commission to infringe upon landowners’ 
constitutional property rights.109 Moreover, the remaining private 
land adjoining public easements often suffers depreciation in value 
due to the easement.110 Landowners subject to an OTD often invoke 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,111 asserting that the 
government has unconstitutionally taken land without just 
compensation. 
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,112 the seminal 
Supreme Court case concerning governmental takings, the petitioner 
challenged South Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act of 1988, 
which “had the direct effect of barring [the] petitioner from erecting 
any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels.”113 Prior to 
the decision in Lucas, courts had a rudimentary understanding of the 
“maxim that, ‘while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.’”114 In an 
effort to add clarity to what is considered “too far” in regard to 
regulatory takings, the Supreme Court enunciated two situations in 
which landowners subject to regulatory action must be 
compensated.115 
107. See Duncan, supra note 31, at 64.
108. Id. at 62.
109. See supra Section III.B.
110. See Garcia & Baltodano, supra note 2, at 191–92.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
113. Id. at 1007.
114. Id. at 1014–15 (quoting Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
115. Id. at 1015.
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a. Regulations that compel a landowner to suffer
a physical “invasion” of property 
The first situation in which the government is required to 
compensate a landowner for a “taking” is when the landowner is 
compelled to suffer a physical “invasion” of property.116 The 
Supreme Court explained that “no matter how minute the intrusion, 
and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, [courts] 
have required compensation” when the landowner has suffered a 
physical invasion.117 The Court illustrated just how minute a taking 
can be when it cited Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp.,118 in which “New York’s law requiring landlords to allow 
television cable companies to emplace cable facilities in their 
apartment buildings constituted a taking, even though the facilities 
occupied at most only 1½ cubic feet of the landlords’ property.”119 
While it may seem that the sacrifice of private lands for public 
access easements would entitle landowners to compensation, a 
conditional taking based on a permit application does not qualify as a 
physical invasion.120 Rather: 
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before 
engaging in a certain use of his or her property does not 
itself ‘take’ the property in any sense: after all, the very 
existence of a permit system implies that permission may be 
granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as 
desired.121 
Stated in other terms, whereas “the Fifth Amendment’s just 
compensation provision is designed to bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,”122 a rational 
permit regulation scheme is imposed on the public as a whole to 
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
119. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (citation omitted).
120. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (“Had California simply
required an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order 
to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house 
on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”). 
121. Id. at 845 n.2.
122. Landgate Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 953 P.2d 1188, 1195 (Cal. 1998) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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ensure that orderly development of real property, benefiting as well 
as burdening owners.123 
Thus, in considering regulations that require a landowner to 
suffer a physical invasion of property, courts have cited Lucas in 
concluding that landowners subject to giving up land as a condition 
of a coastal development permit are not protected under the Takings 
Clause.124 
b. Regulations that deny all economically beneficial
and productive use of land 
The second situation in which a landowner is entitled to 
compensation for a governmental taking “is where regulation denies 
all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”125 The 
Supreme Court explained that: 
[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without
economically beneficial or productive options for its use—
typically, as here, by requiring land to be left substantially
in its natural state—carry with them a heightened risk that
private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.126
The Supreme Court went on to hold that “when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically 
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his 
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”127 
Once again, landowners who are required to give an OTD as a 
condition of a coastal development permit are not protected by this 
situation under the Fifth Amendment. Unless a public easement 
denies all economic and productive use of the landowner’s property, 
the governmental regulation does not constitute a taking, and is 
therefore constitutional.128 Unless the landowner can show that the 
condition imposed is unrelated to the proffered public purpose, the 
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., id.
125. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
126. Id. at 1018.
127. Id. at 1019.
128. Id. at 1015–16.
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condition will not be considered a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.129 
IV. PROPOSAL
Given the lack of consistency in Coastal Commission decisions, 
the deference given to the Coastal Commission by California courts, 
and the important constitutional property rights at stake, the coastal 
development permit process needs to be corrected. This section 
proposes model legislation that should supersede the Coastal Act. 
This proposed legislation would: (1) clarify and heighten the 
standard of review to be used in OTD challenges, (2) refine the 
procedural process for challenging an OTD, (3) require mandatory 
mediation between landowners and the Coastal Commission as a 
prerequisite to litigation, (4) redirect the burden of proof to the state 
in conditioning an OTD on a coastal development permit, and (5) 
shorten the 21-year OTD acceptance period. 
A. Clarify and Heighten the Standard of Review
for OTD Challenges 
One of the major downfalls of the Coastal Act is its failure to 
articulate the applicable standard of review for OTD challenges. 
Although Nollan introduced a standard of review in 1987, California 
courts have been inconsistent in applying the nexus test.130 In 1994, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dolan v. City of Tigard,131 a 
factually similar case originating in Oregon. In Dolan, the petitioner 
challenged an Oregon court ruling that allowed the city to “condition 
the approval of her building permit on the dedication of a portion of 
her property for flood control and traffic improvements.”132 The 
Supreme Court explained that it granted certiorari “to resolve a 
question left open by [its] decision in Nollan, of what is the required 
degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the city and 
the projected impacts of the proposed development.”133 
129. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that “unless the
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building 
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion”). 
130. See supra Sections II.C.2.a, III.B.
131. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
132. Id. at 377.
133. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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While the Court maintained the nexus test it articulated in 
Nollan,134 it added an additional component to heighten a state’s 
burden in “attempting to require easements across private 
property.”135 After satisfying the nexus test, courts must “determine 
whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the [government’s] 
permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected 
impact of petitioner’s proposed development.”136 Worded differently, 
the state must “make some sort of individualized determination that 
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development.”137 The Supreme Court went 
on to say that “simply denominating a governmental measure as a 
‘business regulation’ does not immunize it from constitutional 
challenge on the ground that it violates a provision of the Bill of 
Rights.”138 The Supreme Court believed that the Fifth Amendment 
was best encapsulated by this “rough proportionality” requirement.139 
In order to promote consistency in litigation resulting from 
conditional grants to coastal development permits, the state should 
implement legislation that clearly defines a standard of review that 
aligns with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Nollan and Dolan. Such 
a standard would require the state to meet both Nollan’s nexus test 
and Dolan’s rough proportionality test. Not only will a clearly 
articulated standard of review promote efficiency in litigation, but it 
may also deter landowners from resorting to litigation if they are able 
to evaluate their cases based on an explicit and conspicuous standard 
found in state law.140 Given the financial costs to both landowners 
and the state in litigation, it is within the state’s interest to deter 
landowners from bringing suit over Coastal Commission decisions. 
By eliminating confusion and clearly articulating the applicable 
standard of review in OTD challenges, the state may be able to avoid 
subsequent suits from aggrieved landowners. 
134. Id. at 397.
135. See Morris, supra note 1, at 1031.
136. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388.
137. Id. at 375.
138. Id. at 392.
139. Id. at 391.
140. See infra Section V.B.2.
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B. Refine the Procedural Process for Challenging an OTD
Landowners seeking to challenge a Coastal Commission
decision requiring an OTD face strict procedural hurdles.141 To 
summarize, according to the Coastal Act, if a landowner seeks to 
challenge the Coastal Commission’s OTD condition to a grant of a 
coastal development permit, he or she must file a writ of mandate 
within sixty days of the Coastal Commission’s decision.142 Failure to 
file a writ of mandate within sixty days bars a landowner from 
judicially challenging the Coastal Commission’s decision, as the 
statute of limitations has passed.143 Given the importance of 
constitutional property rights, specifically in the context of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a sixty-day statute of 
limitations seems inappropriately short. Numerous suits have been 
filed challenging the sixty-day statute of limitations.144 In order to 
efficiently protect the property rights of affected landowners, the 
newly implemented legislation should stipulate a 120-day statute of 
limitations. Doubling the existing statute of limitations will give 
landowners additional time to consult with attorneys and experts and 
to consider judicial history before deciding to challenge the Coastal 
Commission’s conditional approval of a coastal development 
permit.145 
C. Require Mandatory Mediation Between Landowners and the
Coastal Commission as a Prerequisite to Litigation
In order to minimize the number of suits filed by aggrieved
landowners, the newly implemented legislation should require all 
OTD challenges (as well as other coastal development permit 
challenges) to submit to mediation prior to filing a formal lawsuit. As 
previously discussed, it is in the state’s best interest to minimize 
litigation over coastal development permit challenges due to the 
141. See supra Section II.C.1.
142. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30801 (West 2007).
143. See supra Section II.C.1.
144. See Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Super. Ct., 258 Cal. Rptr. 567 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
the petitioner’s failure to file petition for writ of administrative mandate within 60 days of Coastal 
Commission’s decision to grant permit rendered Coastal Commission’s decision final); see also 
Serra Canyon Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 110, 114 (Ct. App. 2004) (“Once the 
Commission’s permit decision becomes final, the affected property owner is estopped from 
relitigating the validity of the decision in a subsequent inverse condemnation action.”). 
145. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26–27 (describing the procedural hurdles in challenging
OTDs, specifically the limited timeframe of sixty days). 
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extraordinary costs associated with the trial process.146 This interest 
is exemplified by the fact that in OTD challenges, the state is the 
defendant, which forces the state to spend money to defend Coastal 
Commission decisions. In forcing the parties to submit to mediation, 
the state may be able to keep the sizable number of OTD challenges 
out of the court system, saving both petitioners and the state 
significant money, as well as alleviating the courts from having to 
spend valuable time and resources litigating otherwise resolvable 
cases.147 
Furthermore, requiring landowners to first submit to mediation 
will give them a preliminary look at the strength of their OTD 
challenge.148 If a landowner is able to see that he or she has a weak 
case in mediation, he or she may be less likely to file a subsequent 
lawsuit challenging the OTD (or other coastal development permit 
condition). In regard to the procedural considerations of this 
mandatory mediation, the newly implemented legislation should 
place the costs associated with the process entirely on the state. As 
discussed, landowners who give OTDs are not entitled to 
compensation, despite losing title to part of their properties.149 Thus, 
if the state seeks to take property from its citizens for public use 
without just compensation, it should bear the costs associated with 
the procedural formalities.150 
Mediation, as a non-binding process, will give landowners and 
the Coastal Commission an idea of the potential outcomes if the 
146. See supra Section IV.A.
147. See Jeffery J. Dywan, An Evaluation of the Effect of Court-Ordered Mediation and
Proactive Case Management on the Pace of Civil Tort Litigation in Lake County, Indiana, 2003 
J. DISP. RESOL. 239, 240–41 (2003) (detailing two studies in the state of Indiana in which 82
percent and 65.8 percent of cases that submitted to mediation were settled through the mediation
process as opposed to continuing to trial, respectively); see also Robyn E. McDonald, The
Critical Role of Mediation in Bridging the Access to Justice Gap, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2014, at 69,
75 (“The Canadian Study reinforces the proposition that mediation can assist litigants (self-
represented, indigent, modest means, or otherwise) to resolve disputes, thereby decreasing the
caseload of the courts and the burden on the bench and staff.”).
148. See McDonald, supra note 147, at 75.
149. See supra Section III.C.
150. With varying rates among mediators, the newly implemented legislation should be clear
in placing a maximum limit for mediation fees that will be covered by the state. In other words, it 
is not appropriate for a landowner to only agree to the presiding of an unreasonably expensive 
mediator. If the landowner insists upon having an unreasonably expensive mediator preside over 
the mediation, the landowner should be responsible for the mediator’s fees, less the state’s 
maximum limit. 
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proceeding were to result in formal litigation.151 Landowners and the 
Coastal Commission must mutually agree on the presiding mediator. 
This will help to prevent both parties from asserting bias or 
procedural unfairness if the result of mediation is not to their liking. 
If the parties decide not to agree to the mediator’s recommendations 
and either party seeks formal judicial review, they shall have 120 
days to file a formal lawsuit, in accordance with the previously 
mentioned refinement of the procedural processes.152 
D. Redirect the Burden of Proof to the State in Conditioning
an OTD on a Coastal Development Permit 
One of the most prominent problems with OTD challenges and 
its resultant litigation is the discrepancy between the parties in regard 
to resources, influence, and control.153 The struggle between 
landowners and the state over OTDs and other coastal development 
permit conditions is reminiscent of the struggle between David and 
Goliath.154 The Coastal Act gave the Coastal Commission unfettered 
discretion to grant or deny coastal development permits,155 courts 
give great deference to the Coastal Commission’s decisions,156 and 
courts impose the burden of proof on the landowner to show that the 
condition constitutes a taking.157 Given that state courts usually defer 
to Coastal Commission decisions,158 it is extremely difficult for 
private landowners to overcome the political machine that protects 
state interests at the expense of its citizens.159 
While the Antoine court argued that placing the burden on the 
petitioner is an efficient way to protect coastal resources,160 doing so 
severely compromises landowners’ ability to protect their 
constitutional rights to property. Given that the state takes title to 
private lands after an OTD is recorded, it is only appropriate that the 
state carry the burden of proof in showing that the imposed condition 
151. See McDonald, supra note 147, at 75.
152. See supra Section IV.B.
153. See supra Section III.A.
154. 1 Samuel 17.
155. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30801 (West 2007).
156. See Hess, supra note 8, at 27.
157. Antoine v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 478 (Ct. App. 1992); see also
supra Section II.C.2.b. 
158. See Hess, supra note 8, at 27.
159. See supra Section II.C.2.b.
160. Antoine, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
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is not an unconstitutional taking. The state has a nearly unlimited 
stream of resources, retains the exclusive control of coastal lands and 
the coastal permit process, and is afforded strong deference in the 
courts.161 Although it is virtually impossible to level the playing field 
between the state and private landowners since the state dwarfs the 
petitioners in terms of resources and influence, shifting the burden of 
proof to the state will help to deter the state from infringing upon its 
citizens’ constitutional rights in an unchecked manner. 
In shifting the burden to the state, the newly implemented 
legislation will require the state to show that there is indeed a nexus 
between the original purpose of the condition and the burden 
imposed162 and that the “dedication is related both in nature and 
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”163 Rather than 
giving the state unfettered discretion, shifting the burden will hold 
the state accountable and, simultaneously, work to protect the 
constitutional rights of private landowners. Therefore, the newly 
implemented legislation should clearly and conspicuously place the 
burden of proof on the state, in accordance with the proposed 
heightened standard of review in Section IV.A.164 
E. Shorten the Twenty-One-Year OTD Acceptance Period
Under the Coastal Act, the state has twenty-one years from the
date of recordation to accept an OTD, after which the OTD is 
converted into a permanent public easement owned by the state.165 If 
the state fails to accept the OTD, the OTD condition expires and the 
title of the property reverts to the landowner.166 Newly implemented 
legislation should significantly reduce the timeframe that the state 
has to accept the OTD. A property owner with an outstanding OTD 
on his or her land will undoubtedly realize a lower appraisal value if 
he or she attempts to sell during the twenty-one-year OTD 
acceptance period. Potential bona fide purchasers will likely be 
unwilling to pay the same amount for a burdened piece of property as 
they would for an identical unburdened one, as the state’s potential 
future acceptance of the OTD would decrease the value of the 
161. See supra Section III.A.
162. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
163. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
164. See supra Section IV.A.
165. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26; see also supra Section II.C.
166. Id.
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property in question. This uncertainty impedes the landowner’s 
ability to sell his or her property for fair market value for over two 
decades from the time of the OTDs recordation. 
To alleviate these concerns and to eliminate the uncertainty 
regarding the title of the landowner’s property, the newly 
implemented legislation should require the state to accept the OTD 
within ten years of its recordation. Ten years gives the state ample 
time to find and approve of an entity that will be responsible for both 
opening and managing the public easement.167 Given that private 
property rights are constitutionally protected,168 the state should be 
required to accept the OTD in a timely manner. As it stands, the 
Coastal Act is unfair in that it requires petitioners to challenge 
Coastal Commission decisions within sixty days, yet it gives the state 
twenty-one years to accept an OTD.169 In order to create a more fair, 
yet realistic and efficient, system, this twenty-one-year acceptance 
period should be limited to ten years. 
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSAL
As discussed throughout this Note, there are numerous reasons 
to replace the Coastal Act with more efficient, clear, and fair 
legislation. These reasons include both constitutional concerns and 
policy considerations. 
A. Constitutional Concerns
The most pressing reason to replace the Coastal Act with a more 
clear, fair, and thorough legislative scheme is to better protect the 
constitutional property rights of landowners. Given that landowners 
receive no compensation for their properties when they give an OTD 
to the state,170 are required to challenge an OTD within sixty days or 
lose title to their property,171 bear the burden of proof in 
demonstrating that an OTD is an unconstitutional taking,172 and are 
handicapped in selling their land for a twenty-one-year period,173 
their constitutional rights to property are significantly infringed. The 
167. Id.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
169. See Hess, supra note 8, at 26; see also supra Section II.C.
170. See supra Section III.C.
171. See supra Section II.C.1.
172. See supra Section II.C.2.b.
173. See supra Sections II.C, V.F.
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only way to better protect these constitutional rights from the state, 
which controls both the administrative body and the courts, is to 
replace the Coastal Act with more fair and balanced legislation. Only 
then will landowners enjoy more adequate protection of their 
constitutional rights. 
B. Policy Considerations
1. Provide Clarity and Consistency
The Coastal Act fails to create a clear and consistent process for 
OTD challenges. Specifically, the Coastal Act does not articulate the 
applicable standard of review,174 assign the burden of proof in OTD 
challenges,175 or provide general guidance in adjudicating OTD 
challenges. The failure of the Coastal Act to enunciate specific 
standards and applicable legal principles has created an arbitrary and 
unpredictable system.176 By explicitly clarifying the applicable 
standard of review, placing the burden of proof squarely on the state, 
and providing revised time frames and procedures for OTD 
challenges, the proposed legislation will promote a more efficient, 
predictive, and cost-effective system. 
2. Discourage Costly and Time-Consuming Litigation
Along with the lack of clarity and consistency regarding the 
standard of review comes increased litigation due to the 
unpredictability of the system. In defining a clear standard of review, 
assigning the burden of proof to the state, and requiring mandatory 
mediation prior to judicial review, the proposed legislation will 
discourage litigation, which is both costly and time consuming. 
Through the newly proposed legislation, landowners and the Coastal 
Commission will be able to reference a clear standard of review, 
evidentiary burdens, and the independent opinion of a mediator, all 
of which will give the parties a better understanding of their 
respective legal positions. This added knowledge will allow both 
parties to better evaluate if litigation will be successful. With this 
ability to better predict the outcome of litigation, it is possible that 
174. See supra Sections II.C.2.a, III.B.
175. See supra Sections II.C.2.b, III.B.
176. Id.
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many landowners who otherwise would have brought suit will be 
much more reluctant to do so. 
3. Eliminate Discrepancies in Control, Influence, and Power
Between the State and Private Landowners 
With the passage of the Coastal Act, the state legislature gave 
the Coastal Commission a near-monopoly in regard to coastal 
control.177 Furthermore, courts have almost completely deferred to 
Coastal Commission decisions in OTD judicial review, in addition to 
placing the burden of proof on the landowner.178 This combination of 
factors makes it incredibly difficult for a petitioner to overcome the 
state’s political machine that protects the state’s interests at the 
expense of the landowners. By heightening the standard of review, 
refining the procedural process, placing the cost of mediation on the 
state, and shifting the burden of proof to the state, the proposed 
legislation will better balance state interests with landowner interests 
and lessen the stranglehold that the state has over the OTD challenge 
process. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, there are numerous important breakdowns within the 
Coastal Act that need to be resolved in order to pave the way for a 
more efficient and fair solution to the OTD issue. While the goals of 
the Coastal Act are valiant, the process, fairness, and efficiency of 
the coastal development permit and OTD challenge systems are 
severely deficient. The state has almost monopolized control over 
coastal development and has significantly impaired the constitutional 
rights of private landowners. In short, the system is broken. 
While there is no doubt that litigation challenging future OTDs 
will continue, as some landowners will never simply accept the 
state’s requirement of giving land for a public easement, the system 
can be replaced by a more complete, clear, and efficient one that will 
balance state interests with the interests of landowners in a more fair, 
equitable, and competent way. In clarifying and heightening the 
standard of review for OTD challenges, refining the procedural 
process, requiring mediation prior to judicial review, placing the 
burden of proof on the state, and shortening the state’s OTD 
177. See supra Section III.A.
178. Id.
2016] PUBLIC ACCESS TO COASTAL LANDS 243 
acceptance period, new legislation will help to alleviate many of the 
underlying constitutional and policy concerns that plague the Coastal 
Act at the expense of the state’s citizens. While the power struggle 
between private coastal landowners and the state has raged for 
decades, California has the opportunity to become a model for other 
states through the passage of the proposed legislation, which will 
supersede the unfair, unorganized, and ineffective Coastal Act. 
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